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Abstract—CODEX (COrnell Data EXchange) stores secrets
for subsequent access by authorized clients. It also is a vehicle
for exploring the generality of a relatively new approach to
building distributed services that are both fault-tolerant and
attack-tolerant. Elements of that approach include: embracing
the asynchronous (rather than synchronous) model of compu-
tation, use of Byzantine quorum systems for storing state, and
employing proactive secret sharing with threshold cryptography
for implementing conﬁdentiality and authentication of service
responses. Besides explaining the CODEX protocols, experiments
to measure their performance are discussed.
Index Terms—Distributed systems, Fault tolerance, Access
controls, Client/server and multitier systems, Information storage
1. INTRODUCTION
CODEX (COrnell Data EXchange) is a distributed service
for storage and dissemination of secrets. It was designed to
be one of the components in a secure publish/subscribe com-
munications infrastructure, providing the support for storing
secret keys used to encrypt published information objects and
ensuring that (only) authorizedsubscribers retrieve those secret
keys. Conﬁdentiality, integrity, and availability of the secret
keys being stored is crucial; server failures must be tolerated;
and attacks must be thwarted.
The protocols to coordinate CODEX servers avoid a large
class of vulnerabilities by making only weak assumptions
about the execution environment. For example, correct oper-
ation of the protocols does not depend on assumptions about
message delivery delays or processor execution times. Since
denial of service attacks invalidate such assumptions about
timing, we build into CODEX an intrinsic defense against
certain denial of service attacks by designing for this asyn-
chronous model of execution. In particular, the conﬁdentiality,
integrity and availability of secret keys stored by CODEX
cannot be compromised by attacks to cause delays.
But adopting the asynchronous model brings challenges.
Protocols for consensus and other replica-coordination prob-
lems arising in distributed systems require stronger assump-
tions [14]. CODEX does employ replication, so this gap must
somehow be bridged. The solution employed by CODEX
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exempliﬁes what we are ﬁnding to be a general approach—
carefully choosing a semantics for the service that skirts the
need to do certain types of coordination but nevertheless can
meet the needs of clients.
Embracing the asynchronous model also means that
CODEX cannot offer real-time guarantees to clients. Availabil-
ity is eventual. However, nothing about the CODEX protocols
per se introduces unpredictable delays in processing client
requests. Real-time bounds could therefore be derived for the
case where the system and environment are not under attack.
Admittedly, some clients require that responses always be
generated in a timely manner—this is simply an unsatisﬁable
requirement if denial of service attacks can cause arbitrary
slowdowns.
The design of CODEX also explicates a second set of tech-
nical problems that arise when moving beyond fault-tolerance
to supporting attack-tolerance as well. That is the tension
between employing replication and protecting conﬁdentiality.
Integrity and availability are enhanced by replication; conﬁ-
dentiality is not. In CODEX, besides client secrets (which
are stored in encrypted form and therefore can safely be
replicated), secrets are used to implement the service itself
• for encrypting the client secrets that CODEX is storing,
and
• for authenticating CODEX responses to clients.
These service secrets cannot be stored in encrypted form, since
they must be available for use by CODEX servers. So such
secrets cannot be replicated.
To preserve conﬁdentiality of secrets used for implementing
conﬁdentiality and authentication, CODEX employs secret
sharing [38], [1] with proactive refresh [27], [25], [24], [17],
[16], [41] in concert with threshold cryptography [8], [9], [6],
[7], [18], [31]: secrets are split into shares; each secret share
is periodically refreshed and stored by a separate server; and
cryptographic operations are performed by ﬁrst having each
server compute a partial result using its local secret share and
then combining the partial results to obtain what would have
been computed if the cryptographic operation were performed
using the original secret rather than the shares.
CODEX was motivated by and satisﬁes an application need,
but the project was actually undertaken to address broader
scientiﬁc questions. The COCA distributed certiﬁcation au-
thority [40] demonstrated that a fault-tolerant and attack-
tolerant service could be implemented by embracing the asyn-
chronous model and by employing proactive secret sharing
in conjunction with threshold cryptography. We wondered
whether COCA represented a singular point or did it instantiate
a general recipe that could be repeated for other services too?2
Building another system (CODEX) was expected to shed light
on these questions about generality.
This paper thus should be seen not only as a discussion of
how one might implement a service for storing and dissemi-
nating secrets but as an exercise in evaluating (and reﬁning)
a promising recipe for building services that are both fault-
tolerant and attack tolerant. The CODEX system itself is
implemented as approximately 42K lines of C++ code, most of
which consists of general-purpose libraries designed to allow
rapid developmentof new services, especially those employing
quorum replication.1
We proceed as follows. In §2, assumptions made by CODEX
about the execution environment are discussed. The client
interface to CODEX is next explained in §3. Then, §4g i v e s
a high-level view of the protocols that characterize CODEX
(and its predecessor COCA); protocol details are given in
Appendix A and Appendix B. CODEX performance is the
subject of §5, and related work is described in §6. Section §7
contains some concluding remarks.
2. ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE ENVIRONMENT
CODEX makes only a few, rather weak assumptions about
the environment in which it executes and about attackers. We
believe these few assumptions constitute a realistic approxi-
mation of the hosts and links comprising today’s Internet.
Communications links between hosts are presumed to be
unreliable and insecure.
Insecure Links Assumption: Messages in transit may be
disclosed to, deleted, or altered by adversaries; new
messages may be injected. But a message sent sufﬁciently
often from one host to another will eventually be deliv-
ered.
The only weaker assumption we can imagine is to offer no
guarantee that hosts can use links to communicate, but without
communicationit would be impossible for clients to coordinate
with CODEX or with each other.
Under the Insecure Links Assumption, message delivery
delays are potentially unbounded, which models network con-
gestion and certain denial of service attacks. A second source
of delay in CODEX arises because clients and servers are
executed by hosts that have ﬁnite resources. Here, parallel
activity (perhaps from a denial of service attack) means
that message transit and process execution can be slowed
arbitrarily. The situation is abstractly characterized by:
Asynchrony Assumption: Message delivery and server
computation times are unbounded.
Note, the Asynchrony Assumption is actually a non-
assumption about timing.
Finally, the only assumption we make about hosts is that
not too many fall under control of the adversary.
Compromised Hosts: A host is either correct or compro-
mised. A compromised host might deviate arbitrarily from
its protocols and/or disclose information. But fewer than
one-third of the hosts runing CODEX servers are assumed
to be compromised at any time.
1The complete CODEX source is available for download from the CODEX
homepage http://www.umiacs.umd.edu/∼mmarsh/CODEX
If all hosts run the same software then an adversary that
compromises one replica will probably be able to exploit that
same vulnerability at other replicas and compromise them too.
A single exploit could then cause Compromised Hosts to be
violated. One solution is to employ diversity, so that CODEX
servers are not identical in their design or implementation
and therefore do not have common vulnerabilities. For some
system components,diverse implementations already exist. For
other components, diversity must be created—here, automatic
introduction of diversity during compilation, loading, or in the
run-time environment is a promising approach.
3. CODEX CLIENT INTERFACE
CODEX binds secrets to names. Bindings are write-once—
only a single value is ever bound to each name. The three2
CODEX operations enable clients to manipulate and retrieve
bindings:
• create introduces a new name;
• write associates a (presumably secret) value with a name;
• read returns the value associated with a name.
Having create and write be distinct—rather than a single
compound operation—provides the ﬂexibility to separate the
administration of a secret from associating a value with that
secret. We expect distinct principals will be concerned with
these two kinds of operations, and we expect the operations
to occur at different times.
Clients of CODEX can expect the following security prop-
erties to hold:
CODEX Availability: Authorized invocations of create,
read and write that are not concurrent with other in-
vocations involving the same CODEX name, if repeated
sufﬁciently often, cause the corresponding operations to
be performed.
CODEX Conﬁdentiality: Executing read is the only way
to learn a value that CODEX stores.
CODEX Integrity: Executing write, giving a name that
does not yet have a value associated, is the only way to
bind a value to that name.
Authorization policies specify which invocations of oper-
ations are performed and which are ignored by CODEX.
A client p presents credentials Cθ(p,N) when invoking an
operation θ for a name N; the authorization policy Pθ(N) for
operation θ and name N deﬁnes a relation |=θ such that
Cθ(p,N) |=θ Pθ(N)
holds if credentials Cθ(p,N) are sufﬁcient for the operation
to be performed. CODEX does not include an implementa-
tion for |=θ nor does it ﬁx a representation for credentials.
However, contemporary authorization engines, like SDSI[35],
KeyNote[2] or the work of Hayton et al. [23], do provide such
implementations and could well be incorporated into CODEX.
2The lack of any sort of key deletion operation in CODEX is deliberate.
After a key has been deleted, information encrypted using that key becomes
unavailable, which we saw as inconsistent with the archival nature of the
publish/subscribe system CODEX was designed to support.3
1) Client p sends to CODEX the invocation message
MC(N):  create,N,CC(p,N),PW(N),PR(N) p
2) Client p awaits conﬁrmation message
ˆ MC(N):  bound,M C(N) CODEX
Fig. 1. Client protocol for the create operation.
CODEX associates a separate authorization policy with each
of the three operations it supports. PC(N) controls which
clients can create a new CODEX name N. Having such an
authorization policy helps defend against resource-exhaustion
attacks—for example, the CODEX name space might be
partitioned into groups, with a unique client authorized to
do create for CODEX names in a group. PW(N) governs
which clients can write the value that CODEX binds to N.
And PR(N) governs which clients can read that value.
To invoke a CODEX operation, a client p opens a TCP
connection to CODEX and sends an invocation message;
invocation messages for unauthorized or otherwise ill-formed
operations are ignored by CODEX. Upon completing an
operation, CODEX replies to p with a conﬁrmation message.
If no conﬁrmation message is received after a respectable
interval, then the client may resend the invocation message;
receipt of duplicate invocation messages does not cause prob-
lems for CODEX, because the three CODEX operations are
idempotent.
Invocation messages are digitally signed by the client invok-
ing the operation; conﬁrmation messages are digitally signed
by CODEX and contain either the invocation message m or
its digital signature sig(m), so that a client can ascertain that
the response is not a replay.
3.1 create
Figure 1 gives the invocation message MC(N) and conﬁrma-
tion message3 ˆ MC(N) for a create operation that is on behalf
of client p and that deﬁnes a new name N to have write policy
PW(N) and read policy PR(N).
Each CODEX name can be deﬁned only once. Duplicate
create invocation messages bring copies of the same conﬁr-
mation message; subsequent or concurrent create invocation
messages for a given name but with different authorization
policies are considered ill-formed and are ignored.
3.2 write
Figure 2 gives the invocation message MW(N) and conﬁr-
mation message ˆ MW(N) for a write operation by a client p
intending to associate value s with name N. Keyword write,
name N, and credentials CW(p,N) in MW(N) should not be
surprising.
Value s is being sent in encrypted form (fourth ﬁeld
of MW(N)) so passive wiretappers that intercept and read
MW(N) are unable to compromise CODEX Conﬁdentiality.
The inclusion of create conﬁrmation message ˆ MC(N) in
MW(N) (ﬁfth ﬁeld) ensures that name N has been created
3Henceforth, we write  m p to denote a message m digitally signed by
client p and write E(v) to denote the result of encrypting a value v according
to the CODEX public key.
1) Client p sends to CODEX the invocation message
MW(N):  write,N,CW(p,N),E(s), ˆ MC(N),Π(s,p) p
2) Client p awaits conﬁrmation message
ˆ MW(N):  stored,N,sig(MW(N)) CODEX
Fig. 2. Client protocol for the write operation.
before p attempts to associate a value with N. Even though a
client might be careful to send the write invocation message
after sending the create invocation message, CODEX will
not necessarily receive this pair of messages in that order
(due to the Insecure Links Assumption coupled with message
retransmissions). By requiring that a write invocation message
contain a create conﬁrmation message, the ordering pathology
is avoided.
Π(s,p), the ﬁnal ﬁeld of MW(N), is a non-malleable
proof4 that p knows plaintext s (as opposed to knowing only
encrypted plaintext E(s), which is already the fourth ﬁeld
of MW(N)). Eliminate the requirement that Π(s,p) appear in
MW(N) and a malicious client q could then read s as follows:
Intercept MW(N); copy E(s) from MW(N) into a write
invocation message for some new name Nq that q creates and
for which PR(Nq) includes q; then, perform a read naming
Nq. Such attacks are ruled out if write invocation messages
require demonstrations of plaintext knowledge, because now
attacker q is unable to construct needed ﬁnal ﬁeld Π(s,q) due
to the non-malleability of Π(s,p).
Because CODEX names are write-once, subsequent write
invocation messages are considered ill-formed and ignored if
they attempt to bind different values to a name. Also, concur-
rent write invocation messages containing the same name but
different values are considered ill-formed and ignored.
3.3 read
The conﬁrmation message for a read must convey the value
val(N) that CODEX binds to a name N, but not as cleartext
or else a passive wiretapper intercepting that message would
be able to compromise CODEX Conﬁdentiality.
A naive solution would be to encrypt val(N) using the
public key of the destination client (say) p. But CODEX
is implemented by a set of servers, and according to the
Compromised Hosts Assumption no server can be trusted
to have val(N) as cleartext. So this naive solution would
require a protocol to transform E(val(N)) (which is what
CODEX servers store) into val(N) encrypted by client p’s
public key, without plaintext becoming available during inter-
mediate steps. Such re-encryption protocols (e.g., [26], [39])
unfortunately involve considerable communication overhead;
the cost makes them infeasible for use here.
Therefore, CODEX employs blinding[4] to protect the con-
ﬁdentiality of val(N) while in transit. A client performing
a read includes E(bp) in the invocation message, where
E(bp) is a fresh random blinding factor bp encrypted with
4A proof Π(s,p) that p has knowledge of s is deﬁned to be non-malleable
if that proof cannot be transformed into a proof Π(s ,p) that p knows some
other secret s or transformed into a proof Π(s,q) that some other principal
q knows secret s. The scheme used by CODEX is described in Appendix B.4
1) Client p sends to CODEX the invocation message
MR(N):  read,N,CR(p,N),E(bp),Π(bp,p) p
2) Client p awaits conﬁrmation message
ˆ MR(N):  blind,N,val(N) × bp,sig(MR(N)) CODEX
Fig. 3. Client protocol for the read operation.
the CODEX public key. By construction, for a homomorphic
cryptosystem such as RSA,
E(val(N)) × E(bp)=E(val(N) × bp)
holds and, by design, each CODEX server stores E(val(N)).
Thus, each CODEX server can compute E(val(N)×bp) from
information available to it (viz E(val(N)) and E(bp)) and
can then employ threshold decryption to obtain val(N) × bp
without ever materializing val(N) or bp; so the conﬁrmation
message sent to p contains val(N)×bp, which is undecipher-
able without bp. And client p (which does know bp) recovers
val(N) by dividing val(N) × bp by bp.
Figure 3 details invocation message MR(N) and conﬁrma-
tion message ˆ MR(N) for a read operation by a client p to
retrieve the value CODEX binds to a name N. Given the
preceding discussion, the presence of keyword read, name
N, credentials CR(p,N), and encrypted blinding factor E(bp)
in MR(N) should not be surprising.
To understand the need for including knowledge of plaintext
proof Π(bp,p) in MR(N), consider a client q that is authorized
to read Nq but is under control of an adversary. And suppose
there were no requirement that clients provide knowledge of
plaintext proofs in invocation messages. Here is an attack that
allows q to determine val(N): By intercepting an invocation
message from a client p, client q learns E(bp); by intercept-
ing the corresponding conﬁrmation message, client q learns
val(N) × bp. Client q now initiates read, twice, naming Nq:
• ﬁrst, q sends encrypted blinding factor E(bp) (obtained
by interception); val(Nq) × bp is returned
• second, q sends encrypted blinding factor E(bq) for some
fresh bq known to q; val(Nq) × bq is returned.
Client q can now recover bp by computing:
val(Nq) × bp
(val(Nq) × bq)/bq
This knowledge of bp, then allows client q to calculate val(N)
from val(N) × bp (intercepted earlier). Note, however, that
q would be unable to provide Π(bp,q) for its ﬁrst read
invocation, so this attack is foiled by requiring read invo-
cation messages to contain knowledge of plaintext proofs for
encrypted blinding factors.
4. COCA REDUX: CODEX AS A DISTRIBUTED SERVICE
The protocols used by CODEX resemble those in COCA,
since a reason for building CODEX was to explore how
broadly applicable those COCA protocols are. Grouped ac-
cording to function, here is a high-level description of the
protocols.
4.1 Coordinating Server Replicas
COCA and CODEX both employ server replication to
ensure availability; a Byzantine quorum system [28] stores
the service state. Each CODEX operation is implemented as
a sequence of service steps, where a service step involves the
servers comprising some quorum. The same quorum is not
necessarily involved in all service steps for a given operation,
because quorums are deﬁned so that the intersection of any
two quorums contains a correct server—when performing a
service step Σ, results of all previous service steps are thus
available from the correct servers in the quorum performing
Σ. For a system with 3t+1servers, as many as t compromised
servers can be tolerated if the set of quorums comprises all
sets containing 2t +1servers.
The service steps comprising an operation and the exis-
tence of quorums is hidden from CODEX clients. Besides
simplifying client interactions with CODEX, hiding such
internal details allows server cryptographic keys to be changed
periodically, a powerful defense (as discussed below in §4.3).
CODEX internals are hidden (as also done in COCA) by
employing a delegate—itself a CODEX server—to receive
the invocation message from a client and then to orchestrate
execution of the operation by initiating the various service
steps. The delegate is also responsible for constructing the
conﬁrmation message that is sent back to the client when op-
eration execution is ﬁnished; responses received from servers
are combined to form this response.
A single delegate could be compromised. Clients therefore
send each invocation message to t+1servers, recruiting t+1
delegates so that at least one is correct. A response from a
correct delegate will be correct. Moreover,because delegate re-
sponses include cryptographically-secureinformation obtained
from a quorum of services, clients are able to identify and
reject corrupted responses from compromised delegates. (The
method for doing this—self-verifying messages—is sketched
below.) All responses from correct delegates will thus be
consistent; any responses from a compromised delegate will
either be consistent with the correct response or will be
detectable.
The existence of t +1delegates leads to considerable
duplication of server effort, but idempotence of service steps
ensures these executions do not interfere with each other. Still,
there is the matter of performance, as each delegate forwards
the same requests to all servers, waits for (the same) responses,
and so on. Fortunately, an optimization employed in COCA
applies to CODEX as well.
• Servers cache copies of the response they compute for a
given request, so a server only has to do the real work
once and can reply to a duplicate request with a cached
response.
• Most of the delegates delay before starting, and each del-
egate immediately terminates its activity if ever it receives
evidence5 that another delegate has sent a conﬁrmation
message back to the client. A delegate will see evidence
because, being a server, it is also processing delegates’
5Only messages that cannot be forged constitute evidence that may be used
to cause delegate termination.5
requests on behalf of that same client’s t other invocation
messages.
Each service step is performed by a subset of the CODEX
servers; not by all servers. States at correct servers could thus
diverge, and replica coordination becomes tricky. In COCA,
which supports operations to read and update values associated
with names, server states include unforgeable integrity checks
and unforgeable ordered labels. When a COCA operation is
performed by a quorum, the state of one server in the quorum
is selected—speciﬁcally, a state is selected that satisﬁes the
integrity checks and has the largest label. This selection
criterion yields the most recent correct state, because every
pair of quorums intersects and every operation is performed
by some quorum.
In CODEX, the semantics of operations provides the ba-
sis for a simpler way to determine which server’s state is
most recent for any given CODEX name. This is because
the state-altering CODEX operations—create and write—are
performed only once for a given name, and the create must
precede the write. So a state in which a name N has been
deﬁned is more recent than a state where N has not been
deﬁned, and a state in which some value is bound to N is
more recent than a state in which no value is bound to N.
Moreover, by including the create conﬁrmation message in a
write invocation (it is the ﬁfth ﬁeld; see Figure 2), a server
that was not involved in performing the create for a given
name but that is involved in processing a write for that name
always receives the justiﬁcation it needs to perform a create
retroactively for that name.
The possibility does exist in CODEX for concurrent invo-
cation of conﬂicting operations with a given name, such as
multiple create operations (but with differing authorization
policies) or multiple write operations (but with differing
values). CODEX makes no guarantees about termination for
conﬂicting create and write operations, pushing the problem
onto CODEX clients. By transferring this burden to clients,
CODEX avoids an unsolvable agreement problem (given the
Asynchrony Assumption). So CODEX clients must synchro-
nize with each other and/or partition the name space to ensure
that conﬂicting operations are not executed concurrently. Au-
thorization policies PC(N) and PW(N) provide the means to
enforce name-space partitioning.
Finally, some defense is needed against compromisedclients
or servers, since they might not follow the CODEX proto-
cols and might send bogus messages in an effort to subvert
CODEX. CODEX employs the same defenses here as COCA.
All CODEX messages are constructed to be self-verifying,
which means the receiver of a message m has a validity check
to determine that information conveyed in m is not a replay
and is consistent with the CODEX protocols. A message that
passes the check is said to be valid. Receivers ignore self-
verifying messages that are not valid, effectively transforming
Byzantine server failures to message loss.
Typically, a message is made self-verifying by adding
cryptographically-protected information, such as a digital sig-
nature (perhaps even a threshold digital signature) or a cryp-
tographic proof of plaintext knowledge. Sometimes a validity
check will embody inferences involving messages from mul-
tiple distinct senders. One example is that if t +1servers
attest to a statement P, then at least one correct server has,
so P must hold and a message attesting to P should pass the
validity test; another example is that if a quorum of servers
attest to a statement then it is safe to conclude that no quorum
of servers would attest to the negation of that statement.
4.2 Secure Links from Insecure Links
In CODEX, as in COCA, repeated message retransmission
is used to overcome message loss admitted by the Insecure
Links Assumption. Repeated retransmission of a given mes-
sage is ended once the sender has been notiﬁed of successful
receipt. This notiﬁcation is usually signaled in a subsequent
message (sometimes, but not always, an acknowledgment)
from the receiver or from some other process that has received
a message (directly or indirectly) from the receiver.
Some CODEX protocol steps require that a message be
conveyed to any set comprising AckNo out of the 3t +1
CODEX servers. This is implemented by executing 3t +1
repeated sends in parallel, and terminating all once responses
have been received from AckNo servers.
Conﬁdentiality of message contents is implemented in
COCA by encryption; CODEX in addition uses blinding, for
the performance reasons outlined in §3.3. Receivers detect
message alteration in both COCA and CODEX by employing
digital signatures.
4.3 Servers and Service Authentication
In CODEX, as in COCA, each server has a public/private
key pair, with the public key known to all servers (hence,
known to all delegates). Delegates can thus authenticate re-
sponses from servers and determine when responses have been
received from a quorum. Clients do not know server public
keys. This allows server private keys to be changed without
incurring an obligation to inform clients of the corresponding
new public keys.
The private key of a server is not only changed when server
compromise is detected but it is also changed periodically.
Such periodic key refresh is known as proactive security,
since it anticipates and defends against undetected server
compromise as well as detected server compromise.
Recall from §3, conﬁrmation messages are signed by
CODEX and secrets stored by CODEX are encrypted using
its public key. The corresponding private key is shared by
the n CODEX servers using an (n,t +1 )secret sharing
scheme, so no CODEX server has to be trusted with that
private key.6 Threshold cryptography is then employed to
generate signatures on conﬁrmation messages and to decrypt
content that was encrypted under the CODEX public key.
Speciﬁcally, a delegate recruits t+1CODEX servers to each
generate partial cryptographic results using its share; these
results are then combined by the delegate. A set of t +1
servers, by assumption, includes one that is not compromised,
so each threshold cryptographic operation is performed only if
6With an (n,t +1 )sharing, there are n shares, any subset of size t +1
sufﬁces for recovering the secret, but nothing about the secret can be learned
from a smaller subset.6
some correct server has received sufﬁcient evidence to justify
executing the operation.
An adversary must know at least t +1shares in order to
construct the CODEX private key. Whereas the Compromised
Hosts Assumption rules out the adversary controlling t +1
servers, it does not rule out the adversary compromising one
server and learning the CODEX private key share stored there,
being evicted, compromising another, and ultimately learning
t+1shares. To defend against such mobile virus attacks, both
COCA and CODEX employ the APSS [41] proactive secret
sharing protocol. This protocol is periodically executed, each
time generating a new sharing of the private key but without
ever materializing the private key at any server. Because older
secret shares cannot be combined with new shares, a mobile
virus attack would succeed only if it is completed in the
interval between successive executions of APSS, and this
interval can be as short as a few minutes. (Executions of APSS
measured by Zhou et al. take a few seconds [40].)
5. PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENTS
Performance measurements of CODEX were made both
for a LAN deployment and for an Internet deployment. Both
deployments comprised four servers running on separate hosts,
so the system was capable of tolerating a single compromised
server (i.e., t =1is being assumed). We also assumed for our
experiments that the ﬁrst delegate that a client contacted was
correct, which we modeled by deploying a single delegate
(rather than t +1delegates) on one of the hosts running a
CODEX server.7 Our measurements were performed using
the Unix getrusage system call, which has an inherent
granularity of 10ms; values presented are the means and RMS
variances of the distributions.
ElGamal [12] is used in the prototype for encryption, and
RSA [34] is used for digital signatures.8 The public moduli for
RSA and ElGamal are 1024 bits. Private keys are split into ﬁve
shares—four are randomly generated and the ﬁfth constrains
the sum of all the shares to be the shared secret. Each server
receives three of the four random shares and the ﬁfth “public”
constraint share.9
In the CODEX prototype, secure communication is estab-
lished using the OpenSSL implementation of the TLS ver-
sion 1 protocol. Connections between servers are maintained
for as long as possible; the impact on protocol execution times
caused by using these secure links is thus minimal.
We conjectured that modular exponentiations for cryp-
tographic operations would dominate the most expensive
7The case where the ﬁrst delegate contacted is compromised is no different
for CODEX than for COCA. Since the performance implications of this were
explored extensively in the evaluation of COCA, making the simplifying
assumption here of a correct delegate seemed defensible.
8A suitable proof of plaintext knowledge for RSA was not known to
us at the time we ran these experiments or we would have used RSA for
encryption as well as for digital signatures. In fact, a variant of the Fiat-Shamir
identiﬁcation protocol can be used for proofs of plaintext knowledge [30],
[21].
9Here, we follow the convention of [31], in which all private shares are
generated in the same way and are independent of one another. A simpler
scheme would generate only four shares, where the fourth adds the necessary
constraint to the three random shares and each server receives only three
shares, but the security of such a sharing has not been proved.
CODEX operations, so we decomposed the cost of crypto-
graphic operations accordingly. To simplify the exposition,
costs are normalized to Tsig, the cost of performing one
exponentiation with an exponent on the order of the size of
the public modulus.
Message Signing: This operation involves one exponen-
tiation with an exponent on the order of the size of the
public modulus. The cost for message signing is thus, by
deﬁnition, Tsig.
Partial Signatures: This operation involves one expo-
nentiation but the size of a threshold RSA share is
approximately twice that of the public modulus, so that
exponentiation takes twice as long. The exponentiation
must be done for each of the four shares held by a server.
We therefore expect cost of computing a partial signature
to be approximately 8Tsig.
Partial Decryption: This operation is similar to partial
signature generation, except that threshold ElGamal does
not require shares larger than the public modulus. The ex-
pected time for a partial decryption is thus approximately
4Tsig.
Π(s,p) Veriﬁcation: This operation involves two expo-
nentiations, one approximately the size of the public
modulus and the other using a 160-bit (SHA-1) hash
output: an approximate cost of 1 + 160/1024 with our
normalization. For a delegate, this computation must be
done twice, since the delegate also receives the request
as a server. Therefore the cost of checking Π(s,p) proofs
is approximately 2.3Tsig for a delegate and 1.2Tsig for
other servers.
DLProof Generation: When using ElGamal, a simulta-
neous discrete log proof is needed to demonstrate that a
partial decryption result is correct. Generating this proof
requires two exponentiations and must be done for each
of the four shares held, so the cost for generating a
simultaneous discrete log proof is approximately 8Tsig.
DLProof Veriﬁcation: Verifying a simultaneous discrete
log proof involves four exponentiations, where two use
hash results as exponents. The hash algorithm (SHA-1)
has a 160-bit output, so the normalized cost of each
veriﬁcation is 2+2· (160/1024). Each server must
perform this veriﬁcation on the partial results from ﬁve
shares when examining the supporting evidence for a
read conﬁrmation message, which costs 11.5Tsig. The
delegate must also verify the proofs from the partial
results of four shares contributed by each of the two (t+1)
servers needed to form a threshold decryption, or eight
additional veriﬁcations costing 18.5Tsig, for a total cost
to the delegate of 30Tsig for 13 veriﬁcations.
From these individual costs and the protocol details (see
Appendix A), we can predict the total cost of each CODEX
operation. Note, the cost of checking a signature is negligible,
so this is ignored in the accounting that follows. A create
operation costs10 each server roughly 9 Tsig.Awrite operation
10Each server signs the request as part of its ACCEPT in step 3a, which
costs Tsig, and each server generates a partial signature in step 4b, which
costs 8Tsig.7
TABLE 1
PERFORMANCE OF CODEX OVER A LAN.
Operation Total CPU Time (ms) Non-Idle Time (ms) Idle Time (ms)
create 172.8 ± 4.11 7 0 .8 ± 5.17 .0 ± 4.0
write 241.6 ± 4.72 3 9 .3 ± 6.17 .4 ± 4.8
read 1055 ± 5.3 1052 ± 7.38 .0 ± 5.3
The statistics for each of the measurements come from 110 requests. All times
are measured on the delegate.
will cost about 12.3 Tsig for the delegate11 and 11.2 Tsig
for other servers12.Aread operation will cost the delegate13
roughly 53.3 Tsig and other servers14 33.8 Tsig. In the absence
of other signiﬁcant time costs, we would then expect (for the
delegate) write to take about 1.37 times as long as create and
expect read to take about 5.92 times as long as create. This
is consistent with actual measurements reported below.
5.1 LAN Deployment
The LAN deployment of our CODEX prototype comprised
four dual-Pentium III systems (1130MHz processors) running
Linux. Round-trip times for ICMP echo packets typically
measured well under 1ms, making network delays unobserv-
able. The hosts and the network were relatively quiescent
during the experiment. The client was executed on a separate
machine; its processing and latency times are not included in
our measurements.
Mean execution times measured for CODEX create, write,
and read operations are shown in Table 1, and the fractions of
time spent performing various actions are shown in Table 2.
To minimize the impact of network latency and process
scheduling on the values reported in Table 2, time spent on
cryptographic operations is compared to the non-idle time
rather than the total time. Observe that a CODEX read takes
the longest of the three CODEX operations and the cost of
read is dominated by creating and verifying proofs of correct
partial decryption, as expected. The other signiﬁcant processor
time cost for read is computation of partial cryptographic
results, also in agreement with predictions.
Table 3 gives direct comparisons with predictions of the
costs for the various cryptographic operations. All measured
ratios are consistent with our predictions, so we feel conﬁdent
that modular exponentiations are indeed the dominant cost of
the CODEX protocols in a LAN deployment.
An adversary can launch a number of attacks on the service.
We consider two, both attempted denials of service:
11The delegate veriﬁes Π(s,p) proofs in steps 1 and 3, costing 2.3 T sig,
generates signatures in steps 3a and 5a, for a combined cost of 2 T sig, and
generates a partial signature in step 6b, which costs 8 T sig.
12A non-delegate server only has to verify one Π(s,p) proof, in step 3, so
the veriﬁcation cost is now only 1.2 Tsig.
13The delegate veriﬁes Π(bp,p) proofs in steps 1 and 2, costing 2.3 Tsig.
In step 2a it performs a partial decryption (4 T sig), generates a discrete log
proof (8 Tsig), and generates a signature (Tsig). It veriﬁes 13 separate discrete
log proofs in steps 3 and 3a, for 30 Tsig, and generates a partial signature in
step 3b costing 8 Tsig.
14Only one Π(bp,p) proof is veriﬁed by a non-delegate server, so that
cost is reduced from 2.3 Tsig to 1.2 Tsig. Similarly, only ﬁve discrete log
proofs need to be veriﬁed (the others are performed by the delegate in order
to assemble the response and evidence), reducing the DLProof veriﬁcation
cost to 11.5 Tsig.
TABLE 2
COSTS OF OPERATIONS FOR CODEX OVER A LAN.
create write read
TLS 0.012 ± 0.025 0.011 ± 0.021 0.006 ± 0.006
Message Signing 0.104 ± 0.027 0.144 ± 0.023 0.017 ± 0.004
Partial Signature 0.818 ± 0.040 0.590 ± 0.018 0.130 ± 0.004
Partial Decryption 0.071 ± 0.003
Π(s,p) Veriﬁcation 0.212 ± 0.026 0.048 ± 0.005
DLProof Generation 0.130 ± 0.003
DLProof Veriﬁcation 0.593 ± 0.007
Other 0.043 ± 0.045 0.035 ± 0.031 0.007 ± 0.008
The values shown are fractions of the non-idle time spent on the operation.
The statistics for each of the operations come from 110 requests. All times
are measured on the delegate.
TABLE 3
RATIOS OF TIME SPENT IN VARIOUS CRYPTOGRAPHICOPERATIONS
RELATIVE TO MESSAGESIGNING.
Observed Ratio Predicted Ratio
Partial Signature 6.8 ± 1.3 8
Partial Decryption 3.6 ± 0.7 4
Π(s,p) Veriﬁcation 2.5 ± 0.5 2.3
DLProof Generation 6.8 ± 1.3 8
DLProof Veriﬁcation 29.3 ± 5.4 30
Observed quantities are averaged over the operations in which they are used.
• an attack that increases message latencies between servers
• an attack that decreases CPU cycles available on servers.
For the ﬁrst class of attacks, increased message latencies
were simulated by modifying the CODEX binary so that
message delivery could be delayed in a controlled way. We
then simulated having one link under attack and then having
two links under attack. (Recall, the client delegate is never
attacked in our experiments.) The performance of CODEX
under these attack scenarios is shown for create and write in
Fig. 4; there was little point in measuring the performance
of read, because it requires participation of only 2 (i.e.,
t +1 ) servers so delaying 2 out of 4 servers does not delay
completion of this operation.
The horizontal axis in the graph of Fig. 4 is the ﬁxed
latency (in seconds) added to message delivery for links under
attack; the vertical axis is the time taken to process a request.
Notice that CODEX performance does not degrade when only
a single link is under attack. This is because a 4 server CODEX
system can tolerate a single compromised host. But when two
links are being attacked, any request requiring 2t+1(i.e., 3)
responses will be affected by the added latency—each added
second of latency adds one second to the processing time
for such operations. So link latencies only affect rounds of
communications requiring 2t+1responses, and we conclude:
• The threshold signatures in create and write are unaf-
fected.
• The create operation requires one round of communica-
tions with 2t +1servers (the forwarding of the request
and receipt of ACCEPT messages), so it is affected.
• The write operation requires two rounds of communica-
tions with 2t+1servers (one for MW(N) and ACCEPT,
and another for VERIFY and VERIFIED), so it is delayed
twice as much as create.
We next simulated an attack that steals CPU cycles from8
Time taken during Link Attack
write, 2 slow links (fit CL=10.81%)
write, 1 slow link (fit CL=98.21%)
create, 2 slow links (fit CL=78.93%)
create, 1 slow link (fit CL=99.99%)
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Fig. 4. Processing time for requests as a function of the effectiveness of an
attack against the network. Times are measured by the wall clock. Each point
represents ﬁfty requests with standard-deviation error bars marked. Fits and
conﬁdence levels (CL) are shown, with the one-link points ﬁt to a constant
and the two-link points ﬁt to a line.
CODEX by running additional CPU-intensive processes on
servers under attack. The results are shown in Fig. 5. The hor-
izontal axis shows the number of CPU-intensive background
processes competing with the CODEX server process, and
the vertical axis is the time required to complete a request.
Processing times and variances are shown for varying attack
strengths, with ﬁts to the expected dependences.
As with the network attack, attacking a single server does
not affect performance, since 2t+1servers remain unaffected.
Fig. 5 shows that the time required to process a create or
write request increases linearly with the additional load on
the processors. But the slopes here are shallower because
the computations are not concentrated in the protocol steps
requiring full-quorum participation.
• For the create operation, over 80% of the time is spent
in partial signature generation, which is unaffected, and
that suggests the slope of the graph should be under 20%
of the baseline time.
• For the write operation roughly 60% partial-signature
time translates to a slope of less than 40% of the baseline.
In both cases the slopes in Fig. 5 are actually somewhat
smaller, in part because of other expensive operations un-
affected by the attack and in part because of issues such
as process scheduling which might tend to favor the server
process over the background processes.
Time taken during Processor Attack
write, 2 slow processors (fit CL=77.42%)
create, 2 slow processors (fit CL=96.34%)
slope = 0.031 ± 0.006 s
baseline = 0.277 ± 0.002 s
slope = 0.011 ± 0.008 s
baseline = 0.195 ± 0.001 s
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Fig. 5. Processing time for requests as a function of the effectiveness of
an attack against servers. Times are measured by the wall clock, and each
point represents ﬁfty requests with standard-deviation error bars. Linear ﬁts
and conﬁdence levels (CL) are shown for two-server attacks. For clarity one-
server attack results are omitted. Baseline values represent the processing time
in the absence of an attack.
TABLE 4
AVERAGE ROUND-TRIP TIMES FOR ICMP ECHO PACKETS.
INRIA Academia Sinica UT Sydney
Cornell 135.3 ± 45.22 0 3 .1 ± 0.6 223.5 ± 0.6
INRIA 296.4 ± 18.13 2 3 .1 ± 2.8
Academia Sinica 376.9 ± 0.9
All times are measured in milliseconds and are averaged over ten round trips.
5.2 Internet Deployment
The Internet deployment of our CODEX prototype used for
servers the PlanetLab15 Pentium 4 processors running Linux
and located at:
• Cornell University, Ithaca NY (1795MHz)
• INRIA, Sophia-Antipolis France (2193MHz)
• Academia Sinica, Taipei Taiwan (2392MHz)
• University of Technology at Sydney, Sydney Australia
(1795MHz)
The server at Cornell also was the delegate. Average round-
trip times for ICMP echo packets at the beginning of the
experiment are shown in Table 4. As in the local deployment,
the client was executed on a separate host (also located at
Cornell) and was not included in the measurements.
Mean execution times for CODEX create, write, and read
operations are given in Table 5; the fractions of time spent
performing various actions are shown in Table 6 (again relative
15http://www.planet-lab.org9
TABLE 5
PERFORMANCE OF CODEX OVER THE INTERNET.
Operation Total CPU Time (ms) Non-Idle Time (ms) Idle Time (ms)
create 324.3 ± 41.81 9 7 .9 ± 16.41 3 3 .0 ± 38.7
write 490.4 ± 53.3 277.3 ± 28.6 215.5 ± 54.6
read 1441 ± 117.5 1404 ± 113.84 3 .3 ± 33.0
The statistics for each of the measurements come from 110 requests. All times
are measured on the delegate.
TABLE 6
COSTS OF OPERATIONS FOR CODEX OVER THE INTERNET.
create write read
TLS 0.007 ± 0.017 0.010 ± 0.019 0.004 ± 0.005
Message Signing 0.108 ± 0.022 0.145 ± 0.021 0.018 ± 0.008
Partial Signature 0.855 ± 0.040 0.606 ± 0.040 0.238 ± 0.033
Partial Decryption 0.059 ± 0.007
Π(s,p) Veriﬁcation 0.209 ± 0.026 0.039 ± 0.005
DLProof Generation 0.117 ± 0.009
DLProof Veriﬁcation 0.515 ± 0.030
Other 0.031 ± 0.043 0.028 ± 0.031 0.008 ± 0.006
The values shown are fractions of the non-idle time spent on the operation.
The statistics for each of the operations come from 110 requests. All times
are measured on the delegate.
to non-idle time to reduce sensitivity to latencies and schedul-
ing); and comparisons with predictions are given in Table 7.
A processing time of 1.4s for a CODEX read suggests that
current-generation commodity hardware could handle roughly
40 requests per minute.
The time required for CODEX to produce a response is
longer for the Internet deployment than the for LAN deploy-
ment. Mostly, this is a result of slower connections between
servers. But processing times also increased—despite hav-
ing faster processors in the Internet deployment. We believe
this increased processing time can be attributed to memory
swapping with the Internet deployment. The entire CODEX
executable resided in RAM with our LAN deployment, but an
examination of the Cornell PlanetLab machine revealed only
50% of the CODEX executable to be resident, with the rest
in swap space.
6. RELATED WORK
CODEX is structurally similar to e-Vault[19], which is a
data storage and key management system but, in contrast to
CODEX, is not intended to distribute secrets. Both e-Vault
and CODEX employ blind decryption of public-key encrypted
data, a transparent client interface, and secure data storage.
Whereas CODEX holds one private key for the service as a
TABLE 7
RATIOS OF TIME SPENT IN VARIOUS CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATIONS
RELATIVE TO MESSAGESIGNING.
Observed Ratio Predicted Ratio
Partial Signature 8.5 ± 2.9 8
Partial Decryption 3.3 ± 1.0 4
Π(s,p) Veriﬁcation 2.3 ± 0.7 2.3
DLProof Generation 6.3 ± 1.8 8
DLProof Veriﬁcation 27.2 ± 7.7 30
Observed quantities are averaged over the operations in which they are used.
split secret, e-Vault holds the private keys of all its clients
as split secrets. By using a client’s public/private key pair to
protect its symmetric keys, e-Vault obviates the need for the
proofs of plaintext knowledge that CODEX requires. But with
many more private keys as split secrets, the cost of the periodic
share-refresh is much higher for e-Vault than for CODEX.
Also, e-Vault makes a (weak) synchrony assumption, so it
exhibits a vulnerability to network-delay attacks.
Fraga and Powell[15] present what is perhaps the ﬁrst
intrusion-tolerant data storage service in the context of a ﬁle
system. In their system, ﬁles are fragmented and stored on a
set of archive servers. Access to ﬁles is governed by secu-
rity servers, to which a client must authenticate. A separate
symmetric key must be held by the client for each server.
Unlike CODEX, this system employs concurrency control in
order to make operations atomic, though atomicity need only
be enforced on a per-ﬁle basis.
Other work closely related to CODEX concerns key dis-
tribution and key management systems, including multicast
key distribution systems, fault-tolerant key distribution centers
(KDCs), and key escrow systems.
Multicast Key Distribution. Large-scale key distribution has
been studied extensively for encrypted broadcast and multicast
applications (see [13] for a survey). The goal is to distribute
secrets from a sender to authorized recipients. These schemes
are predominantly coordinated by the sender (or a service
acting as its proxy) and require the sender to know all of
the authorized recipients.
The design of [11] shifts some of the coordination to
servers acting as “subgroup managers” and employs capability
certiﬁcates to authorize recipients so that the recipient set need
not be known a priori. A dual encryption scheme isolates most
recipients from changes necessitated by new clients joining or
leaving the broadcast group. The sender still keeps track of
what clients belong to the group, though this is only needed
to prevent a client from joining multiple subgroups and forcing
a greater number of key changes. This design has very good
scaling properties; it is not particularly fault-tolerant, though.
Speciﬁcally, the protocols are ill-equipped to handle any faults
that are not fail-stop and there is no integrity guarantee for the
keys distributed. These properties—scalability without strong
delivery assurance—are sensible for some applications, such
as pay-per-view television broadcasts or online multimedia
streaming. CODEX, in contrast, provides stronger delivery
assurance, albeit without as good scaling properties.
Fault-tolerant KDCs. Much work has been done in con-
structing fault-tolerant KDCs. These are primarily credentials-
issuing services, creating fresh secrets (symmetric keys) rather
than distributing existing secrets (as CODEX does).
Deswarte et al. [10] describe a system that performs both
authentication and authorization. Both operations are per-
formed by distributed services and result in a client receiving
one or more session keys (possibly included in tickets). For
authentication, the client must authenticate itself to each
server, and in order to tolerate faulty servers the client must
share a distinct secret with each server. This makes adding
new clients and servers expensive, though the authors note
that a public key cryptosystem could be used instead of shared10
secrets. Authorization uses the session key returned by the
authentication phase, and a single key can be used for all
authorization servers.
The Kuperee[22] authentication service combines the func-
tionalities of a KDC and a certiﬁcation authority; it comprises
a single KDC and replicated ticket-granting servers, and thus,
unlike CODEX, has a single point of failure. Because Kuperee
uses public keys to identify clients, it obviates the usual
KDC requirement that a secret be shared with each client.
Kuperee still must maintain some information about clients,
namely their public keys, but these need not be protected using
proactive secret sharing.
More traditional KDCs are presented by Gong[20] and Naor
et al.[29]. The service shares a secret with each authorized
client in these. Both systems tolerate Byzantine faults; the
system discussed in [20] assumes synchrony between replicas,
hence it is vulnerable to certain denial of service attacks.
The system in [29] involves no synchrony assumption (like
CODEX), but (unlike CODEX) requires secure links between
clients and individual servers, which further increases the over-
head of proactive recovery by requiring clients periodically
to receive updated server public keys or new link-speciﬁc
symmetric keys. When a client needs a new symmetric key,
it participates in a threshold calculation of a pseudo-random
function dependent on a KDC secret key. This direct client
participation is more efﬁcient than the transparent design of
CODEX, and it might be appropriate in situations where
operational efﬁciency is signiﬁcantly more important than
recovery efﬁciency. We could have designed CODEX along
these lines, but it would have meant abandoningthe transparent
interface and incurring higher proactive recovery cost.
Key Escrow. Key escrow systems store client secrets (pri-
vate/symmetric keys) for access by third parties (eg, law
enforcement) with appropriate authority. In the context of
CODEX, this is equivalent to requiring authorization policies
for the read operation to recognize special credentials.
Chen et al.[5] describe a key escrow system that mediates
Difﬁe-Hellman key agreement between clients, potentially in
different domains, and in which a threshold number of servers
must participate in order to recover the negotiated session key,
which is split among the servers using secret sharing. This
differs from a KDC in that the system merely acts as a proxy;
it does not enforce any sort of authorization. The primary
functionality of this system is computation, rather than storage
or distribution.
The Ω key management service[33] also implements key
escrow, though it manages private keys rather than symmetric
keys. Ω also serves as a CA, a private key repository, and a de-
cryption service. It is built using the Rampart[32] toolkit16 and
tolerates Byzantine failures by using state machine replication.
Ω assumes a synchronous system, relying on timeouts to make
progress, and requires secure links between clients and servers,
again requiring that clients be kept abreast of new server public
keys. Because escrowed keys are stored using secret sharing,
proactive recovery requires that shares be regenerated for each
escrowed key.
16A similar toolkit is discussed in Cachin[3].
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We expected that building CODEX would be a straight-
forward exercise in applying the architecture that we had
developed for COCA. In some ways it was; in other ways
it wasn’t.
The idea of having a service key and implementing it
as a shared secret that is proactively refreshed but never
materialized at any server worked well in CODEX, just as
it did with COCA. The idea of carefully choosing a service
interface so that impossible problems (e.g., agreement in an
asynchronous system) need not be solved within the service
also again worked well. Some services cannot be built while
following these tenets; by constructing ﬁrst COCA and now
CODEX, we have contributed a bit to better understanding
which services can.
A surprise in developing CODEX was that read and write
invocations must include proofs of plaintext knowledge or else
attackers can learn secrets CODEX is storing. The approach
to attack-tolerance embodied in CODEX (and COCA) does
not address vulnerabilities in the service operations, their
interfaces, or their semantics. Such a separation is convenient,
but attacks that abuse the service interface must ultimately be
addressed too. Methods to identify service-interface vulnera-
bilities are badly needed.
APPENDIX A
CODEX PROTOCOL DETAILS
Descriptions of CODEX protocols for create, write, and
read operations are given below. These protocols assume each
server has a public/private key pair, where the public key is
known to all servers; for a message m, we write σi(m) to
denote the signature server Si computes using that private key.
Each server also stores a share of the CODEX private key, with
shares periodically refreshed using the APSS [41] proactive
secret sharing protocol.
To simplify the exposition, the protocols below are formu-
lated in terms of communications links implementing conﬁ-
dentiality, integrity, and mutual authentication of end hosts.
This link semantics is achieved in CODEX with a shared
session key established by TLS using the public/private key
of each server.
A.1 Protocol Details: create
Client p sends invocation message
MC(N):  create,N,CC(p,N),PW(N),PR(N) p
to t +1delegates. Each delegate D upon receiving MC(N)
from a client p proceeds as follows.
1) D determines the validity of MC(N) by checking that
p is authorized to create this name and checking the
signature on MC(N).I fapreliminary registration exists
for N at D, then D also checks that MC(N) is consistent
with that registration.
2) a) If there is no registration for name N at D, then D
stores MC(N), creating a preliminary registration
for N. Whether or not a new preliminary regis-
tration for N was just created, D next forwards11
MC(N) along with a nonce n to all 3t+1CODEX
servers Si
∀i.D → Si : n,MC(N)
using a repeated send primitive and awaiting ac-
knowledgments from 2t +1servers.
b) If there is a veriﬁed registration for name N at D
matching MC(N) then D sends cached correspond-
ing conﬁrmation message ˆ MC(N) to client p and
terminates the protocol.
c) Otherwise, D terminates the protocol.
3) Upon receipt of a message “n,MC(N)” from D, a server
Si determines validity of the message by using the
validity tests of step (1).
a) If MC(N) is valid then Si stores MC(N), creating
a preliminary registration for name N and replies
Si → D : n,ACCEPT,σ i(MC(N))
b) If there is a veriﬁed registration for name N at
Si matching MC(N) then Si sends cached corre-
sponding conﬁrmation message ˆ MC(N) to delegate
D.
Si → D : n, ˆ MC(N)
D, upon receipt and determining that this message
is valid, stores the veriﬁed registration and replies
to client p:
D → p : ˆ MC(N)
c) If MC(N) is not determined to be valid then Si
rejects the request:
Si → D : n,REJECT
If D receives REJECT messages from t+1servers
then obtaining a quorum in step 2a will not be
possible, so D terminates the protocol.
4) An ACCEPT message received by D is determined to
be valid if third ﬁeld σi(MC(N)) checks. Each valid
ACCEPT message received by D is added to an evi-
dence set ED. Once 2t+1pieces of such evidence have
been collected, no other registration for name N can be
accepted, so D creates a veriﬁed registration for N and
composes conﬁrmation message ˆ MC(N) by invoking a
threshold signature protocol with all servers. Let ˆ M
−
C(N)
be conﬁrmation message ˆ MC(N) without the CODEX
signature.
a) ∀i.D → Si : ED, ˆ M
−
C(N)
b) D awaits partial signatures from t+1servers and
uses those partial signatures to construct ˆ MC(N).
Conﬁrmation message ˆ MC(N) is cached at D.
c) D → p : ˆ MC(N)
A.2 Protocol Details: write
Client p sends invocation message
MW(N):  write,N,CW(p,N),E(s), ˆ MC(N),Π(s,p) p
to t +1delegates. Each delegate D upon receiving MW(N)
from a client p proceeds as follows.
1) D determines the validity of MW(N) by checking that p
is authorized to write this name, checking the signature
on MW(N), checking the validity of create conﬁrmation
ˆ MC(N), checking the validity of knowledge of plaintext
proof Π(s,p), and checking that val(N) at D either
already equals E(s) or is uninitialized.
2) If MW(N) is valid then D locally binds E(s) to name
N and then forwards MW(N) along with a nonce n to
all 3t +1CODEX servers Si
∀i.D → Si : n,MW(N)
using a repeated send primitive and awaiting acknowl-
edgments from 2t +1servers.
3) Upon receipt of a message “n,MW(N)” from D, a server
Si applies the validity checks of step (1).
a) If MW(N) is found to be valid then Si locally binds
value E(s) to name N and replies
Si → D : n,ACCEPT,σ i(MW(N))
b) If MC(N) is not found to be valid then then Si
rejects the request:
Si → D : n,REJECT
If D receives REJECT messages from t+1servers
then it terminates the protocol.
4) An ACCEPT message received by D is deemed valid
if third ﬁeld σi(MW(N)) checks. Each valid ACCEPT
message received by D is added to an evidence set ED.
When 2t+1 pieces of such evidence have been collected,
D sends to all servers a message indicating the value
to which N should become bound. In what follows,
n  is a fresh nonce, ˆ M
−
W(N) is conﬁrmation message
ˆ MW(N) but without the CODEX signature, and the send
is repeated until 2t +1responses are received.
∀i.D → Si : n ,VERIFY,M W(N), ˆ M
−
W(N),ED
5) A VERIFY message received by a server Si is deemed
valid if accompanying evidence set ED contains 2t +1
valid ACCEPT messages.
a) Upon receipt of a valid VERIFY message, server
Si binds E(s) from MW(N) to name N and replies
to D:
Si → D : n ,VERIFIED,σ i( ˆ M
−
W(N))
b) If the VERIFY message is not valid, then server
Si rejects the request:
Si → D : n,REJECT
If D receives REJECT messages from t+1 servers
then it terminates the protocol.
6) Each VERIFIED message received by D is added to
evidence set E 
D. Once E 
D contains 2t +1pieces of
evidence, D invokes a threshold signature protocol with
all servers:12
a) ∀i.D → Si : E 
D, ˆ M
−
W(N)
b) D awaits partial signatures from t+1servers and
uses those partial signatures to construct ˆ MW(N).
c) D → p : ˆ MW(N)
A.3 Protocol Details: read
Client p selects a random secret blinding factor bp, encrypts
it using the CODEX public key, and sends invocation message
MR(N):  read,N,CR(p,N),E(bp),Π(bp,p) p
to t +1delegates. Each delegate D upon receiving MR(N)
from a client p proceeds as follows.
1) D determines the validity of MR(N) by checking the
signature on MR(N) and checking validity of knowledge
of plaintext proof Π(bp,p).I fD knows17 PR(N) then
it also checks that p is authorized to read this name.
a) If MR(N) is valid then D forwards MR(N) along
with a nonce n to all 3t +1CODEX servers Si
∀i.D → Si : n,MR(N)
using a repeated send primitive and awaiting t+1
REJECT messages or t +1ACCEPT messages
with partial decryptions from the same sharing.
b) If MR(N) is not valid then D terminates the
protocol.
2) Upon receipt of a message “n,MR(N)” from D, a server
Si applies the validity checks of step (1) and checks
whether some value val(N) is locally bound to name
N. If no value is locally bound to N, then D ignores
the request. Otherwise:
a) If the validity checks are passed then Si computes
blinded ciphertext ci = E(val(N)×bp), its partial
decryption Di(ci) according to the share stored by
Si of the CODEX private key, and proof DLi of
the validity of Di(ci). This information is sent to
D:
Si → D : n,ACCEPT,σ i(MR(N)),c i,D i(ci),DLi
b) If the validity checks did not pass then Si rejects
the request:
Si → D : n,REJECT
If D receives REJECT messages from t+1servers
then it terminates the protocol.
3) An ACCEPT message received by D is deemed valid
if σi(MR(N)) checks and DLi is valid. Each valid AC-
CEPT message received by D is added to an evidence
set ED. When t +1pieces of such evidence have been
collected, D invokes a threshold signature protocol with
all servers to sign ˆ M
−
R(N) creating conﬁrmation message
ˆ MR(N):
a) ∀i.D → Si : E 
D, ˆ M
−
R(N)
b) D awaits partial signatures from t+1servers and
uses those partial signatures to construct ˆ MR(N).
c) D → p : ˆ MR(N)
17D might not have participated in the create operation (either directly or
by receiving a valid write request), so D might not know P R(N).
APPENDIX B
NON-MALLEABLE PROOF Π(m,C)
For ElGamal [12], an encryption of m can be written
(gr mod P,m× yr mod P), where (P,g,y) is the public
key and r is a random exponent chosen by the encryptor.
Knowledge of r allows us to compute m (the converse is not
true), so for a non-malleable proof Π(m,C) that principal C
knows m given E(m), it sufﬁces to prove that C knows r.
We base the construction on a result by Schnorr and
Jakobsson[37] in which they present a non-malleable form of
ElGamal encryption using a Schnorr signature[36] to make
modiﬁcation of the ciphertext detectable. Constructing this
signature requires knowledge of r, and we exploit this to
construct Π(m,C) by including C’s identity in the signature.
The signature is non-malleable, so no other identity can be
substituted for that of C.
All operations are modulo a large prime P of the form
P =2 Q+1, where Q is another large prime. The construction
in [37] is:
1) Select r,s uniformly at random in ZQ.
2) Compute c = H(gs,gr,m× yr), where H is a secure
hash function, such as SHA-1.
3) Compute z = s + cr (over Z, not ZP).
4) Output the signed encryption: E(m,r,s)=
(gr,m× yr,c,z)  (a,b,c,z)
A signed ciphertext (a,b,c,z) is valid if H(gza−c,a,b)=c
holds. Schnorr and Jakobsson prove that this construction is
secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks.
Our contribution is noticing that step 2 can be changed to
include C’s identity (such as a certiﬁcate or credentials), which
we will also denote C. Step 2 then becomes
2  ) Compute c = H(gs,gr,m× yr,C).
This new construction is a valid signature if
H(gza−c,a,b,C)=c holds. Thus in addition to non-
malleability we have a binding of the ciphertext to a
particular identity. The security of this scheme is the same as
in [37].
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